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CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY AND THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
Leah Barteld* 
 
 
Abstract 
Cross-border bankruptcy continues to be an important topic within 
bankruptcy regimes worldwide. As more corporations find themselves 
interacting in a market without the confines of geographic borders, 
countries need to adapt their regulatory schemes to be able to properly 
handle an orderly liquidation or reorganization without an adverse 
impact on the economy. This paper discusses the challenges of creating 
an effective cross-border bankruptcy regime and proposes a solution for 
increasing coordination among insolvency proceedings. As a result of 
increasing cooperation among jurisdictions in light of the recent and 
ongoing financial crisis, reform within the bankruptcy regimes around 
the world is foreseeable. 
INTRODUCTION 
Global Consumer Products Inc., (GCP),
1
 has operations in the United 
States, Germany, Brazil, India, and China. Suppliers and creditors are 
spread globally in Australia, Russia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
GCP’s customers rely on selling GCP products on the customers’ store 
shelves across the globe. This corporation employs hundreds of 
thousands of employees, many whose retirement depends on their stock 
options. GCP is a mega-corporation, a company that personifies the 
growing trend of globalization. The collapse of GCP would be 
catastrophic to the world’s economy. What jurisdiction would be best 
equipped to represent this globally diverse group of creditors? Better yet, 
what jurisdiction would be able to manage an effective reorganization 
that would satisfy creditors, but still protect an employee’s retirement? 
Corporations like GCP highlight the challenges of cross-border 
insolvency proceedings and the need for reform in current practices.  
Views and approaches on bankruptcy have evolved over the years as 
the world faces an increasingly globalized market where the effects of an 
entity, like GCP, entering insolvency, travels beyond geographic borders. 
Currently, international bankruptcy is a “complex area of the law, which 
                                                          
* University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, J.D., Temple University, M.B.A. 
(admitted to the Maryland Bar in December 2012). Leah is now serving a two-year fellowship with 
the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11. Leah would 
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is ‘underdeveloped and inconsistent at best.’”2 Recently, there has been 
an increase in cross-border insolvency cases.
3
 With the globalization of 
trade and “increasing international nature of business,” it is natural to see 
a “similar increase in the number of business failures, and hence also 
with the number of cross-border insolvency cases.”4 Although there is 
still a diverse collection of bankruptcy regimes operating in the world 
today, countries are responding to the globalization trend and working 
toward collaboration and harmonization within bankruptcy systems.
5
 As 
countries continue to respond to the recent financial crisis, this history of 
collaboration is only likely to increase as they work together to address 
concerns about businesses whose failures can be so deeply entangled in 
our global marketplace and how insolvency regimes can be aligned.
6
  
I. APPROACHES TO INSOLVENCY REGIMES 
Most legal systems “provide a legal mechanism to address the 
collective satisfaction of the outstanding claims from assets” (whether 
intangible or tangible) of the debtor if the debtor is “unable to pay its 
debts and other liabilities as they become due.”7 There are a number of 
mechanisms for resolving a debtor’s financial difficulties: voluntary 
restructuring negotiations,
8
 insolvency proceedings,
9
 and administrative 
processes.
10
 Insolvency proceedings can result in either reorganization or 
liquidation.
11
 Although the days of debtor’s prison and torturing a debtor 
are behind us with only a few exceptions,
12
 insolvency regimes still 
                                                          
2  Mike Perry, Note, Lining-Up at the Border: Renewing the Call for a Canada—U.S. 
Insolvency Convention in the 21st Century, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 469, 473 (2000). 
3 PAUL L. C. TORREMANS, CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCIES IN EU, ENGLISH AND BELGIAN LAW 
218 (K.J.M. Mortelmans ed., 2002).  
4 See id. 
5 Joseph Bellissimo, Proposed Insolvency Legislation Fosters Cross-Border Cooperation, THE 
LAWYER’S WEEKLY CANADA (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section= 
article&articleid=529. 
6 Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for Secured Creditors’ Rights 
in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 514. “Cross-border insolvencies are not a 
new phenomenon. However, it was only relatively recently that great strides have been made toward 
more coordinated and efficient cross-border bankruptcies.” Id. at 514. 
7 U. N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, at 9, U.N. 
Sales No. E.05.V10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE].  
8 Voluntary restructuring negotiations are “generally limited to cases of corporate financial 
difficulty or insolvency in which there is a significant amount of debt owed to banks and financiers.” 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 21. Voluntary restructuring negotiations were developed by 
the bank sector and “[l]ed and influenced by internationally active banks and financiers.” Id.  
9 See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 26.  
10 See generally LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 21–29. 
11 See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 26.  
12 In early Roman agrarian society, if a debtor failed to pay his creditor, the debtor could be 
taken captive by his creditor, and if the debts were unpaid for a “further sixty days, the creditor was 
entitled to either put the debtor to death or sell him into slavery across the Tiber River.” Bob 
Wessels, Bruce A. Markell & Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Matters 3, (2009) [Hereinafter Wessels et al.]. Interestingly enough, recent talks in U.S. 
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differ from country to country. If GCP, for example, found itself facing 
insolvency across its global operations, it would face a variety of, and at 
times conflicting, insolvency regimes.
13
 Further, if GCP wanted to 
reorganize, the laws of some jurisdictions in which they operate may not 
be favorable toward reorganization.
14
 Beyond differing philosophies on 
the goals of insolvency, a “dizzying array” of differences and 
disagreements exist between jurisdictions with respect to procedures and 
rules within a bankruptcy case, from the way creditors are required to file 
and substantiate a claim to avoidance of pre-insolvency transactions 
creating a hectic insolvency proceeding for GCP.
15
 These differences as 
discussed below can have an impact ranging from a minor inefficiency or 
individual inconvenience to producing vastly different outcomes for 
certain creditors depending on how a jurisdiction’s rules apply to their 
claim.
16
 With GCP operating in so many jurisdictions that apply different 
rules to creditors, it could increase their overall cost of doing business if 
creditors require more security to protect themselves should GCP 
dissolve in a jurisdiction unfavorable to that creditor. 
Broadly speaking, while insolvency regimes and doctrines can differ 
in both their philosophies and effects on other jurisdictions,
17
 insolvency 
regimes are generally divided into two categories: territoriality and 
universality.
18
 Neither “pure universalism nor pure territorialism” is 
practical; however, hybrid systems have emerged to create “modified 
universalism” and “cooperative territorialism.”19 Each type of insolvency 
regime has benefits and drawbacks in approaching and managing cross-
border insolvency.  
A. Territoriality 
If GCP became insolvent in a territoriality insolvency regime,
20
 it 
would file a case in each separate country, and each country would 
                                                                                                                                  
media suggest the return of a debtor’s prison of sort with “collection agencies taking advantage of 
archaic state laws to have some debtors arrested and sent to jail.” Henry Blodget, The Return of 
Debtor’s Prisons: Collection Agencies Now Want Deadbeats Arrested, YAHOO! FINANCE, (Nov. 22, 
2011, 12:24 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/return-debtors-prisons-collection-
agencies-now-want-deadbeats-172417607.html. 
13 See infra Part I. A. and I. B. for more information on common insolvency regimes. 
14 Outside of the United States and Canada, bankruptcies were typically not conducted with the 
goal of reorganization until more recently. Instead, most countries freeze debt until funding can be 
found or assets sold. More Countries Adopt Similar Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Managing Credit 
Receivables & Collections (Institute for Management & Administration), (Oct. 2002).  
15 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 17–23.  
16 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 17. 
17 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517. 
18  See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 40. (“Whether in trade in goods and services, 
enforcement of judgments or intellectual property rights, or even pursuit of those suspected of 
committing crimes, the overarching key question consistently boils down to the proper balance of 
the competing interests of local protection versus international cooperation.”).  
19 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518. 
20 A past example was the 1992 insolvency law in Japan. Rosalind Mason, Cross-Border 
Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law and Insolvency Law Meet, in International 
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consider the proceeding its own main case.
21
 The territoriality regime is 
best described as the “Grab Rule,” a concept built on the ground that 
“local creditors had legitimate expectations that any financial crisis 
would be resolved applying local policies and principles.” 22  A core 
principle of this approach to insolvency demonstrates the belief that 
“insolvency laws do not, of themselves, have an extraterritorial reach, 
dealing as they must with the application of a given country’s rules to a 
collection of property within the jurisdictional reach of that country.”23  
The benefit of a territoriality regime is that in some situations, 
resolution is more cost effective in protecting local creditors’ rights. 
Local creditors can set realistic expectations for resolution of the case, 
since “property is administered and distributed in each bankruptcy case 
according to the local law in which [the] property resides.”24 Conversely, 
the effects of the bankruptcy proceeding are limited to property that is 
located within that jurisdiction.
25
 If a debtor maintained a bulk of their 
assets in a jurisdiction different from where it incurred most of its debt, 
the limitation of jurisdiction may work to the debtor’s benefit at the 
detriment of the creditor in that the latter would not be able to reach 
those assets.
26
 To counteract this problem, when local creditors make a 
decision to contract with a debtor, they can protect themselves by relying 
only on the security provided by local assets.
27
  
A territorialism approach was unchallenged until relatively recently 
when, “business began commonly to break past the constraints of 
national boundaries to establish both asset bases and networks of 
                                                                                                                                  
Insolvency Law: themes and perspectives, 27, 43 & n.95. (Paul J. Omar ed., 2008). For a discussion 
of Japan’s ongoing substantive preference for territoriality under new Japanese bankruptcy law, see 
Alexander M. Kipnis, Beyond UNICTRAL: Alternatives to Universality in Transnational Insolvency, 
36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 156 (2006), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/djilp/36No2/Beyond-
UNCITRAL-Alternatives-Universatality-Transactional-Insolvency-Alexander-M-Kipnis.pdf. 
However, bankruptcy law in Japan with the passage of the Civil Rehabilitation Law is highly 
influenced by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, so perhaps some of the territorialist aspect will be softened 
by the U.S. influence. Peng Xu, Bankruptcy Resolution in Japan: Civil Rehabilitation vs. Corporate 
Reorganization, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-010 (Feb. 2004), http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/ 
publications/summary/04020008.html. 
21 This type of doctrine, therefore, leaves open the possibility that there could be a “plurality of 
proceedings” with the “exact number and jurisdictional location to be determined by the 
circumstances” in the case. For more information on the territoriality insolvency regime, see Clark & 
Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517. 
22  ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 841 (6th ed. 2009). 
23 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518. 
24 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518. 
25 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518. 
26 See Jacquie McNish, It’s the Law of the Jungle for Creditors: Bankruptcy Proceedings Are 
Seeing Debt-Holders Launch Some Audacious Cross-Border Plays for Assets, GLOBE AND MAIL, 
Jan. 21, 2009, at B9. Parents sometimes use subsidiaries as banks of last resort for restructurings and 
as a result shuffle around assets that could later hurt the creditors’ rights to those assets in an 
insolvency proceeding whose jurisdiction is limited. See id. 
27 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 7. 
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creditors and claims that span many sovereign territories.” 28  This 
unsatisfactory resolution regime for transnational companies has been 
partly addressed by alternative theories within territoriality (e.g., the 
theory of “cooperative territorialism” proposed by Professor LoPucki 
with principals of cooperation and mutual administration).
29
  
B. Universality 
If GCP filed an insolvency case in a jurisdiction with a universality 
insolvency regime, it would face a very different result. Universality 
regimes focus on the fact that bankruptcy is a collective proceeding that 
“must extend to all the debtor’s assets and stakeholders,” and a resolution 
must therefore be “symmetric to a debtor’s market.”30 The focal point of 
this holistic approach is that “for every debtor there should be a unified 
process of administration with all claims and interest channeled through 
one main proceeding.”31 In a case brought under a universality doctrine 
in the debtor’s domicile country, all of the debtor’s property, regardless 
of its location, is brought to the home jurisdiction for resolution, and 
creditors must bring their claims in that jurisdiction.
32
 If GCP’s home 
jurisdiction for purposes of insolvency was considered the United States, 
for example, all of the corporation’s property, whether in India, China, or 
elsewhere, theoretically, would be brought into the United States’ 
jurisdiction for claim resolution purposes. Universality can sometimes be 
compared to ordinary bankruptcy proceeding found in the United States, 
and is considered to be more in “conformity with the very nature of 
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings” 33  in addition to being more 
economical, faster, and more efficient.
 34
 
But while a universality regime has the benefit of a belief that 
“expects that the effects—on both the property and the interests of the 
                                                          
28 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 41. 
29 For more information on “cooperative territorialism,” see Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6. 
“The five areas LoPucki suggests ought be the subject of cooperation: (1) the establishment of 
procedures for replicating claims filed [in a bankruptcy proceeding] in any one country in all of 
them; (2) the sharing of distribution lists by representatives to ensure that later distributions do not 
go to creditors who have already recovered the full amounts owed to them; (3) the joint sale of 
assets, when a joint sale would produce a higher price than separated sales in multiple countries or 
when the value of assets within a country is not sufficiently large to warrant separated 
administration; (4) the voluntary investment by representatives in one county in the debtor’s 
reorganization in another; and (5) the seizure and return of assets that have been the subject of 
avoidable transfers.” See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 520 & n.50. 
30 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 841. 
31 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517. 
32 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 516. 
33 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 4. “This argument is based on two assumptions. One is 
that in nature bankruptcy and insolvency proceeding are a form of collective liquidation and 
distribution of the assets of the debtor. The second one is that the assets can be seen as a single entity 
that is linked to the person of the debtor.” See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5. 
34 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5. 
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debtor—will be worldwide,” there are a number of drawbacks.35 Even 
though universality eliminates “discussion concerning the issue of which 
asset should go in which national territorial bankruptcy,” there are still 
contested issues regarding the location of intangible assets and whether 
the jurisdiction in which the asset is located is willing to give up 
applying local law to the distribution of said asset.
36
 Recognizing these 
drawbacks, an alternative theory of modified universality has developed 
and is considered the best balance between pure universality and 
territoriality regimes.
37
 
Since pure universality is unrealistic,
38
 “modified universality begins 
with the idea of pure universalism, and then moves toward the center of 
the spectrum by incorporating certain territorialism tendencies.”39 This 
type of doctrine tries to address the problem of a debtor that could easily 
choose a forum based on the laws that will be applied, thus engaging in 
“forum shopping.”40 If GCP, for example, went to file its insolvency 
case, it might select a forum that had more protections for debtors at the 
expense of creditor’s rights.41 At a theoretical level, scholars would argue 
that a universal system, even modified universality, is far superior to 
territorialism because the approach is “market symmetrical,” and a global 
market requires a global bankruptcy law that provides “a single 
proceeding that can apply rules and reach results that are conclusive with 
respect to all stakeholders through the global market.”42  
                                                          
35  One drawback is the protection of the creditors’ rights is not as certain as within a 
territoriality jurisdiction. Because the home country’s laws in the debtor’s home country are applied, 
expectations of creditors may be defeated by differing rules of distribution and priority. 
Additionally, there can be a considerable cost with consolidating all of the debtor’s assets and 
creditor’s claims in one court, especially in the case of “far-flung assets” that may have been better 
addressed in the jurisdiction of their physical location. Finally, there can be a challenge in funneling 
the assets of an entity into a home country’s jurisdiction and control if there is a not a treaty or 
agreement in place that would increase the likelihood that a country would let property “located in 
their jurisdiction be administered under anything other than local law.”  See generally Clark & 
Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517–518. 
36 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5–6.  
37 The compromise between universality in bankruptcy law and national sovereignty inherent 
in the concept of modified universality recently provided the basis for the conclusion of an 
international bankruptcy concordat instructive to Canada and the United States. Perry, supra note 2, 
at 478. 
38 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 49. “In its purest form, universalism would mean that 
one worldwide court (or system of courts operating under one administrative umbrella) would apply 
one set of insolvency laws to all international insolvency cases.” See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 
49.   
39 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at n.34. 
40 “Effective co-ordination measures should eliminate any potential incentive for parties in 
financial difficulties to engage in forum shopping by transferring assets to those Member-States [in 
the E.U.] that are perceived to have a more favorable protective regime.” See TORREMANS, supra 
note 3, at 139.  
41 For a discussion on jurisdictions with a high degree of creditor orientation and a ranking of 
creditor-debtor orientation by selected countries see Armin J. Kammel, The Law and Economics of 
Corporate Insolvency – Some Thoughts, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: THEMES & 
PERSPECTIVES 65-66 (Paul Omar ed., 2008). 
42 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 49. 
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In a modified universalism system, the lead court in administering the 
case is the company’s “‘home country,” which is typically determined by 
the “center of its main interest” or “COMI.” 43  For example, if an 
insolvent corporation’s “home country” is the United States, U.S. courts 
would assert worldwide jurisdiction over the assets of the debtor.
44
 With 
the choice of forum addressed, the question of choice of law can often be 
a distinct issue, although related to which country is the “home country.” 
In any cross-border bankruptcy case, the court will be required to choose 
which bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law to apply. With this 
knowledge in hand, debtors can be incentivized to file in a country that 
favors the debtor’s needs, or avoid a “priority that would otherwise be 
enjoyed by a particular creditor constituency in another country where 
some assets or operations were located.”45 Therefore, these choices in a 
universalism system can be determinative of the resolution of the 
insolvency case for a multinational corporation.  
This concern is partially addressed by modified universality
46
 because 
it recognizes the downside of a system where a “debtor can easily choose 
a substantive law that will govern their insolvency and that is contrary to 
the expectations and interests of creditors.”47 This theory has emerged as 
the dominant theory of insolvency regime. However, some of the benefit 
of a universalist system where assets and claims are consolidated is lost 
within the modified universalism regime. Modified universality allows 
an ancillary court to “retain their right to protect local creditors;” 
therefore, some of the predictability of knowing in advance the debtor’s 
home country and laws that will be applied is lost.
48
 Many of the more 
modern bankruptcy regimes are reforming to align to a modified 
universality structure. Despite differences in insolvency regimes around 
the world, there is a history of cooperation between jurisdictions for the 
purposes of managing cross-border insolvency cases and the 
reorganization or liquidation of multinational businesses.  
II. HISTORY OF COOPERATION 
To address the growing number of cross-border insolvencies, 
practitioners, judges, and legislators have “craft[ed] gap-filling solutions 
to bring order to the chaos of uncoordinated cross-border insolvency 
                                                          
43 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 843. 
44 There are some challenges to this assertion if the United States cannot find a way to assert 
personal jurisdiction over the entity. “Two grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with 
due process are asserted here: (i) transnational jurisdiction as set forth in 1 Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws §47(1)(1971) and (ii) general ‘doing business’ jurisdiction as set forth in §47(2) of 
the Restatement.” In re McLean Industries, Inc, 68 B.R. 690, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
45 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 515. 
46 The United States adopted a modified universality regime with the 2005 amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
47 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 519 & n.35. 
48 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 519. 
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cases” with creativity and dedication.49 Some countries have successfully 
reached agreements to cooperate in cross-border insolvency cases, at 
least regionally if not globally.
50
 The importance of harmonized 
insolvency legislation is that it provides a “higher degree of certainty and 
reciprocity for the players.”51  Jurisdictions recognize that there is value 
and efficiency in an insolvency proceeding in mainly one jurisdiction, 
where one court primarily, although not necessarily exclusively, can 
control the assets of the restructuring and coordinate the treatment of 
creditors.
52
 However, historically, many of these efforts at cross-border 
cooperation were either very regionalized, or did not achieve widespread 
adoption. 
A. Treaties 
One of the first efforts that countries used to establish cooperative 
efforts for insolvency proceedings that spanned geographic borders was 
the use of treaties. Treaties have the advantage of being the “local law” 
in “all jurisdictions in which the treaty is adopted.”53 While the power of 
a treaty can be helpful, it can also be quite limited if the number of 
signatories to the treaty is small, since the treaty is only effective in the 
countries that have signed it. As a result, using treaties proved to be an 
unsuccessful method for coordinating insolvency proceedings across 
several countries. 
B. Comity 
Comity is used by countries to recognize foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings. Both Canada and the United States have used this principle 
to recognize proceedings of companies that are highly interconnected 
between the two neighbors. Under Comity, “the extent that the United 
States and foreign bankruptcy laws are inconsistent is important in 
determination of whether a foreign court’s decrees should be enforced in 
the United States.”54 U.S. courts deferred to the laws and judicial acts of 
the United Kingdom in Maxwell Communication, after determining that 
the “basic notions of due process and fair treatment of U.S. creditors 
were present.”55 The U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to address 
                                                          
49 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at xiii. 
50 There have been formal bankruptcies treaties and attempts at formal bankruptcy treaties 
dating back almost eight hundred years. Perry, supra note 2, at 478. 
51 See Bellissimo, supra note5. 
52 See Bellissimo, supra note 5. 
53 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009). 
54  Mark G. Douglas & Nicholas C. Kamphaus. Cross-Bankruptcy Battleground: The 
Importance of Comity (Part II). (May/June 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/cross-border-
bankruptcy-battleground-the-importance-of-comity-part-ii-05-31-2010/. 
55  Anne Nielson, Mike Sigal & Karen Wagner, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: 
Principles to Facilities the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 533 (1996) 
[hereinafter Nielson et al.]. The Maxwell communications business empire collapsed in the early 
1990s, leaving some 400 subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries spread all over the world. The business 
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Comity in Hilton v. Guyot, and defined it as “the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons 
who are under protection of its laws.”56 Canada also used principles of 
Comity to recognize proceedings that spanned the United States-
Canadian border, because of their frequent economic interaction. 
Comity was later codified in U.S. law. Section 304 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code was designed to “only permit the opening of an 
ancillary case” and did not address the coordination of “full-blown 
proceedings pending both in the United States and another country” and 
was a “dramatic turn away from a history of territorialism.”57 Case law 
developed under this section is still relevant, but the section was later 
repealed by the passage of the new chapter 15 in 2005.
58
    
C. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 
Although the European Union’s member states have been “striving 
for harmony in the area of bankruptcy law for more than forty years” 59 
with little success, real progress was made when the European Union 
developed its most widely adopted pan-European rules governing 
insolvency proceedings. The European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings (Insolvency Convention) was passed on September 25, 
1995,
60
 with final adoption on May 29, 2000.
61
 In order to promote the 
free flow of commerce and creation of a single market within the 
European Economic Community, the leaders recognized the need to deal 
with insolvency and bankruptcy.
62
 The agreement incorporated a number 
of elements of a modified universality approach, as discussed above. The 
Explanatory Report to the Insolvency Convention read: 
[The] Convention seeks to reconcile the principle of 
universality and the protection of local interest and also 
                                                                                                                                  
underwent bankruptcy proceedings under English and U.S. law.  The joint agreement order in the 
MCC case represents a practical approach, taking a worldwide perspective to implementing an 
equitable solution to avoiding conflicts in a potentially very complicated cross-border reorganization 
situation. See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 69. 
56 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895) (holding that the U.S. court should enforce the judgment and that 
the issue should not be “tried afresh” if a foreign forum provides a full and fair trial abroad before a 
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation and 
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an 
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other 
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under 
which it was sitting). 
57 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 523. 
58 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009). 
59 See Perry, supra note 2, at 483. 
60 See Nielson et al., supra note 55. 
61 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 133. 
62 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 133. 
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the principles of the respective legal systems . . . permits 
local proceedings governed by their own lex fori 
concurus (law applicable in the place of insolvency) to 
coexist with the main universal proceeding. Single 
universal proceedings are always possible within the EC, 
but the Convention does not exclude the opening of local 
proceedings, controlled and governed by its rules, to 
protect those local interests.
63
 
More recently, in 2007, the European Communication and 
Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency (Insolvency 
Guidelines) were published.
64
 The Insolvency Guidelines are helpful for 
understanding some of the cumbersome procedures found in the 
Insolvency Convention.
65
 The document highlights the role of a 
practitioner in ensuring that coordination between proceedings take place 
through a duty to communicate information and cooperate.
66
 Although 
the Insolvency Guidelines are not binding, they assist in setting standards 
for knowledge and professional behavior that are key to achieving the 
goals of the EC Insolvency Regulation.
67
 The purpose of the Insolvency 
Guidelines was to introduce rules for “dealing with insolvencies with a 
cross-border element,” but its effectiveness in practice has been 
hampered by the Regulation’s restrictions on application to qualified 
proceedings.
68
 However, even with procedures in place for managing 
insolvencies within the European Union’s borders, there are still 
challenges for forum shopping and companies jockeying among 
jurisdictions to file in the most favorable for their needs and purposes.  
D. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 
In the spring of 1996, the International Bar Association approved the 
“Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat.” 69  The Concordat acted as an 
interim step until “treaties and/or statutes were adopted by commercial 
nations,” and set forth ten general principles. Like the Insolvency 
                                                          
63  Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, (May 3, 1996), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/952/1/insolvency_report_schmidt_1988.pdf.  “The absence of a Convention on 
insolvency proceedings with the framework of the Community is viewed as a short-coming in the 
completion of the internal market.” Id. 
64  Bob Wessels, European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border 
Insolvency: Also of Interest for North-American Practitioners and Judges, International Committee, 
4 ABI Committee News (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter Wessels]. 
65 See Wessells, supra note 64. 
66 See Wessells, supra note 64. 
67 See Wessells, supra note 64. 
68 TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 140. The scope of the Regulation has been restricted in three 
ways: (1) the Regulation deals with insolvency procedures, and sets forth the requirements that need 
to be met before a procedure becomes an insolvency procedure, (2) certain types of companies are 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation and (3) the Regulation is restricted to the European 
Union. TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 140, 144. 
69 Nielson et al., supra note 55. 
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Proceedings, the Concordat employed a modified universality theory and 
was designed to assist courts and counsels in “harmonizing cross-border 
insolvencies.”70 The passage of the Concordat signaled recognition of the 
difficulty, given strong national interests, in the “preservation of 
sovereignty and the absence of treaties in creating truly unified 
proceedings.” 71  The structure of the Concordat resulted in a “central 
administrative forum located in one country, supplemented by ancillary, 
or secondary, proceedings located in other countries.” 72 Cases resolved 
with the help of the Concordat include In re Everfresh Beverages
73
 and 
In re Joseph Nakash.
74
  
  E. ALI Transnational Insolvency Project 
The Insolvency Convention set the stage for further regional 
cooperation. The ALI Transnational Insolvency Project (ALI Project) 
was developed in 2001 by the American Law Institute.
75
 It set out to 
propose “more specific procedures by which such cooperation—
especially coordination of parallel proceedings—might be effectuated.”76 
The ALI principles were established based on the “perceived need for a 
private-sector initiative.” The objective of the ALI Project was limited to 
developing “cooperative procedures for use in business insolvency cases 
involving companies with assets or creditors in more than one of the 
three NAFTA countries.” 77  The proposed principles of cooperation 
include seventeen guidelines that were developed from the lessons 
learned during more than a dozen cross-border cases where courts 
aligned their approaches, communication, supervision and completion of 
a cross-border insolvency case.
78
 The project took an interesting 
                                                          
70 Nielson et al., supra note 55. 
71 Nielson et al., supra note 55. 
72 Nielson et al., supra note 55. 
73 The case of In re Everfresh Beverages involved a bankrupt U.S. corporation with operations 
in both the United States and Canada that filed proceedings in both the US and Canada. During the 
proceedings, both the Ontario Court of Justice and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York issued orders approving a stipulation of cross-border insolvency 
protocol to govern the bankrupt’s provision. The stipulation was consistent with—and almost 
identical to—many of the provisions of the Concordat. Perry, supra note 2, at 486. 
74 In Nakash, the debtor had diversified business interests throughout the world….[and] filed a 
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and 
managed his affairs as debtor and debtor-in-possession. The defendant was a member of the board of 
directors of the North American Bank, Ltd., an Israeli banking institution which was declared 
insolvent and a Receiver was appointed. The case concerned jurisdiction and the extraterritoriality 
application of an automatic stay—with the court holding that participation in the U.S. Chapter 11 
case gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction and found the actions of the Israeli Receiver a violation 
of the automatic stay. See Nakash v. Zur (In re Joseph Nakash), 190 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
75 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 247. 
76 See Wessels et al., supra note 2, at 104. 
77 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The Ali 
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (Winter, 2002). 
78 See id. at 247. 
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approach to develop procedures by first taking the time to get to “know 
each other’s laws,” to report on their findings to all of the stakeholders, 
and to use that knowledge to be able to know how to coordinate those 
proceedings.
79
  Adoption of amended national bankruptcy regimes 
supports the implementation of the principles proposed to increase 
commercial predictability within the NAFTA region.
80
 
F. Other Regional Efforts 
The importance of regional collaboration is best illustrated by the 
result when coordination is absent. When the conglomerate Asia Pulp 
and Paper collapsed in 2001, there were no regional cross-border 
insolvency laws in place at the time.
81
 As a result, the company fell with 
debts of $13.9 billion and its creditors were left with no alternative but a 
“hard fought informal restructuring of the group.”82 Responding to the 
chaotic restructuring, the Asian Development Bank launched a program 
focused on insolvency law reform in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand.
83
  In addition to the regional arrangements now in 
existence in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Northern Europe, and 
Central Africa have structures in place for some form of cooperation.
84
  
G. UNCITRAL 
The most successful example to date of widespread cooperation of 
local courts cooperating within international insolvency cases is the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law 
adopted in 1997.
85
 The law was introduced to try to address some of the 
gaps left behind by regionalized agreements.
86
 Commonly referred to as 
“UNCITRAL Model Law” or just “Model Law,”87 it is the basis for a 
number of local laws concerning cross-border bankruptcy, including 
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
88
 The law was formulated to 
deal with the “rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency 
cases.” 89 The law is an endorsement of cooperation among courts and 
                                                          
79 See id. at 104. 
80 See id. at 247. 
81 Richard Fisher & Michael Sloan, Why Asia Needs a Regional Insolvency Pact: A Regional 
Treaty on Cross-Border Insolvency Would Promote Foreign Investment. 23 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 3 
Mar. 2004. 
82 Id. 
83 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 163. 
84 See generally Wessels et al., supra note 12, 154–162. 
85  About UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
86 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 199. 
87 Here, the author uses “Model Law,” but the terms can be used interchangeably.  
88 Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is very similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
Brad B. Erens & Michael G. Douglas, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Denies Failed Hedge Fund’s Request 
for Chapter 15 Recognition, Mondaq Ltd., (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/ 
article.asp?articleid=53060. 
89 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009). 
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encourages such cooperation by any means permitted within local law.
90
 
To date, the Model Law has been enacted in eighteen nations or 
territories, still far short of widespread adoption.
91
 The Model Law does 
not “envisage a full-scale harmonization of national insolvency laws,” 
but “comes in addition to the substantive insolvency laws of the states 
that will implement it, and it aims to deal with the special difficulties that 
are associated with a number of cross-border insolvency situations.”92 
Other treaties and agreements in existence between countries still 
provide the basis for most cooperative efforts within a cross-border 
bankruptcy case. The Model Law, while providing the basis for domestic 
laws, addresses some important issues in international insolvency only 
indirectly and leaves unanswered questions on choice of law.
93
 Without 
the weight of widespread adoption, the Model Law still lacks credibility 
in many jurisdictions.  
H. Notable Cases 
The importance of attempting to mitigate the conflicts in national 
insolvency regimes when resolving a company with international 
corporate structure was learned through the complicated resolution of the 
Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Founded in 1972 
in Luxembourg, BCCI had more than 400 offices in sixty-nine countries 
and collapsed after years of investigation revealed in 1991 that financial 
statements have been falsified since the bank’s founding. 94  The 
challenges identified that complicated the liquidation of BCCI’s assets 
and reduced the amount that could be distributed to creditors included 
differing insolvency regimes for banks and branches,
95
 different 
liquidation procedures,
96
 the right of set-off differing across regimes, 
97
 
and the potential for criminal charges to be brought to prevent fraud in 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 See Douglas & Kamphaus, supra note 54. 
92 See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 200. 
93 See Mason, supra note 20, at 58. 
94 Richard J. Herring, BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global 
Corporate Structure 5, 2004 (paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference 
on Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies, Sept. 30–Oct. 1) available at 
http://www.iadi.org/Business%20Plans/Cross_Border_Barings_BCCI_Paper.pdf. 
95 For example, the United States follows a “separate-entity doctrine in which the agency or 
branch of a foreign bank is treated as if [it] were a separately incorporated legal entity for purposes 
of liquidation” and some countries, like Luxembourg and the UK follow a “single-entity doctrine.” 
In this doctrine, “foreign branches are treated as offices of a single corporate entity.” Herring, supra 
note 94, at 11.  
96 In the United States, bankruptcy law does not apply to banks. Instead, the “primary bank 
supervisor would liquidate the branch of a foreign bank.” Conversely, some foreign courts apply to 
the same liquidation laws to banks as to other commercial entities, or decide on a case-by-case basis. 
Herring, supra note 94, at 13. 
97 Set off is defined as “a nonjudicial process whereby mutual claims between parties, such as a 
loan or deposit, are extinguished.” Herring, supra note 94, at 21 (citations omitted).  
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bankruptcy proceedings.
98
 The two approaches to insolvency regimes 
have different implications for market discipline and may “undermine 
incentives for creditors with international operations to seek to do 
transactions in well-supervised jurisdictions.”99 With a lack of agreement 
on an international insolvency regime, uninsured creditors of BCCI 
incurred substantial legal expenses and a long wait for settlement of their 
claims.
100
 
I. Case-Level Protocols 
Sometimes coordination can be achieved through case specific 
agreements for those cross-border bankruptcy cases that involve a 
particularly large pool of creditors spread across multiple jurisdictions. In 
In re Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., jurisdictions involved in the 
resolution of the company developed a cross-border insolvency protocol 
that supported the coordination of foreign proceedings.
101
 Under the 
protocol, “the administrators and trustees would have a streamlined 
method for administering intercompany claims, including the creation of 
a committee to discuss methods to resolve those claims” and create a 
framework to minimize the cost and maximize the recoveries to 
Lehman’s creditors. 102  The document lists seven goals, including 
coordination, communication, information and data sharing, asset 
preservation, claims reconciliation, the maximization of recoveries, and 
Comity.
103
 Administrators and trustees in Germany, Australia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, the Netherlands, and the United States have signed the 
Lehman Protocol.
104
 Case-level protocols are not without complications, 
as a case-level protocol does not “address the inherent complexities 
caused by state’s differing insolvency and private international laws” and 
can therefore be difficult to enforce.
105
 A case-level protocol is seen as 
more of an economic solution than a legal approach and fails to provide 
                                                          
98 In jurisdictions where criminal charges can be levied against a bank, even when it has 
entered insolvency (like in the United States), these ancillary charges could actually work to 
“override ex ante repayment priorities and reduce the amounts available for distribution to 
creditors.” Herring, supra note 94, at 15. Some of these challenges are unique to bank insolvency 
proceedings and do not apply to corporate entities in bankruptcy. 
99 See generally Herring, supra note 94. 
100 See Herring, supra note 94, at 18. 
101  Leigh Kamping-Carder, Court OKs Global Lehman Protocol, LAW 360, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/107073 (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
102 See id. 
103 Id. The protocol also gives representatives the right to appear in global proceedings and the 
ability to share certain nonpublic information—including the debtors' books, records, 
correspondence and other documents—and relevant information they can access without payment. 
Additionally, the agreement provides a mechanism for administrators to adjust distributions so that, 
in certain instances, creditors that have received payment for a claim in one proceeding would not 
necessarily receive payment in another. 
104 Id. 
105 See Mason, supra note 20, at 36. 
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the predictability that would help stabilize the market and decrease risk 
when initially contracting with a debtor.
106
 
III. CHALLENGES TO COOPERATION 
Despite movements to create more harmonized insolvency 
proceedings, many barriers still exist to full cooperation of jurisdictions 
in managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. Cultural and legal 
differences between jurisdictions can create friction in the coordination 
of resolution efforts. Even if jurisdictions are able to agree on deferring 
to a primary foreign proceeding, procedural challenges do not end there.  
If the agreement is to place a primary insolvency proceeding in the 
company’s “Center of Main Interests,” how does a jurisdiction determine 
the COMI? This can be a contentious point in an insolvency proceeding 
even with existing cross-border cooperation agreements in place.
107
 For 
example, GCP has operations in the United States, Germany, Brazil, 
India, and China. If its executives and management responsibilities are 
spread evenly among those jurisdictions, how could the COMI be 
determined satisfactorily? In the United States, a main proceeding is 
defined by “a case pending in whatever country contains the debtor’s 
‘center of main interests.’” 108  In order to interpret this statutory 
definition, the courts in the United States are expressly directed to look 
for guidance in the “interpretation of COMI by foreign jurisdictions 
under similar statutes.” 109  The E.U. Insolvency Convention defines 
“COMI” as the “place where the debtor conducts administration of his 
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third 
parties.”110 Courts in the United States have adopted the E.U. Convention 
standard of looking to objective and ascertainable factors to rebut the 
presumption that the jurisdiction of the registered office is the COMI of a 
debtor.
111
 Despite agreement between the European Union and the 
United States on the determination of COMI, this remains a vague 
                                                          
106 See Mason, supra note 20, at 36, (citation omitted).  
107 Keith J. Shapiro et al., America Now! What’s New on the Other Side of the Pond?, 4 ABI 
Committee News (Nov. 2007). 
108 11 U.S.C. §1502(4) (2011). In applying this test, however, the United States has denied the 
recognition of an insolvency proceedings based on the determination that the proceeding was not 
taking place in the entity’s COMI. “Because the foreign proceedings are not pending in a country 
where the funds have their COMI or where that have an establishment, the proceedings are not 
eligible for relief as main or non-main proceedings under chapter 15.” In re Bear Stearns High-Grace 
Structured Credito Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,  374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
109 See Erens & Douglas, supra note 88. 
110 See Erens & Douglas, supra note 88. This definition is very similar to the concept of 
“principal place of business” in U.S. law. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181(2010)(holding that 
“principal place of business” refers to the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, 
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities. Lower federal courts have often metaphorically 
called that place the corporation's “nerve center.”). 
111 In Re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007).  
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definition when applied to a corporation that is truly global in its 
operations, like GCP. Further, although there is harmonization between 
the United States and the European Union in defining COMI, a critical 
term, for purposes of recognizing proceedings, other definitions and tests 
exist. A debtor that has assets and conducts business in more than one 
country could find itself “satisfying the requirements to be subject to the 
insolvency laws of more than one State because of the different tests of 
debtor eligibility or different interpretations of the same test.” 112 
Countries may be unwilling to coordinate with another foreign 
proceeding if procedures and due process are not compatible. 
Cultural attitudes also play a large role in the effectiveness of a 
national bankruptcy system, including approaches to debt forgiveness 
and the “way people stand in life.”113 Different cultures hold different 
legal beliefs and values, and those values shape a domestic insolvency 
regime, including how it treats debtors. As mentioned earlier, debtor’s 
prisons still exist in some parts of the world. Further, a bankruptcy 
regime does not live in isolation, but is under the “influence of a 
particular nation’s overall legal system, where case law or code based”114 
and the economic and financial structure of the domestic market. There 
exists a “close relationship between economic results and legal 
solutions” and insolvency law “underpins the commercial and financial 
dealings in the market economy” and the “choices it makes are a crucial 
indicator of the attitudes and fundamental values of the state’s legal 
system.”115 There is a strong probability that a government will seek an 
insolvency regime that protects local creditors and stakeholders. This is 
not a surprising result, because the government “faces public and policy 
pressure to allocate financial resources in a way that reduces the burden 
for its own taxpayers.”116 
With all of these different factors affecting a country’s national 
bankruptcy system, there is the opportunity for great friction between 
two nation’s insolvency regimes. 117  Any friction between the two 
countries in their cooperative efforts could be further burdened by the 
political overlay.
118
 These interacting factors can make it challenging for 
                                                          
112 See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 41.  
113 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 10.  “[P]hilosophically the United States’ approach is 
that every debtor is a potential entrepeneur.” See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 10. 
114 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 11.  
115 See Mason, supra note 20, at 8. 
116 Aldo Caliari, Transatlantic Cooperation for Post-Crisis Financial Reform: To What End?, 
CTR. OF CONCERN 16 (Apr. 2011), https://www.coc.org/files/PostCrisisRef.pdf.  
117  Aside from political tensions, differences between two jurisdictions can also present 
challenges when sharing information or transferring assets. For instance, China has very strong 
“state secrets” law and may block the exchange of some information if it has deemed that 
information to qualify as a “state secret,” a definition that is inherently broad. The potential “that 
economic and business data may be considered state secrets according to such sweeping 
interpretations has alarming consequences for U.S. companies collecting business data in China.” 
Edward Epstein, When State Secrets Are Not Secret, INSIGHT, Oct. 2010, http://www.amcham-
shanghai.org/amchamportal/InfoVault_Library/2010/When_State_Secrets_are_not_Secret.pdf. 
118 For example, the relations between the United States and Cuba have always been strained to 
say the least. If a multinational corporation was attempting a resolution that was enforceable in both 
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two countries to agree to collaborate on the resolution of an insolvency 
proceeding when their national systems exist in such different contexts. 
Cross-border insolvencies therefore “thrust these systems into sometimes 
uneasy partnerships,” forcing them to choose between “finding some 
means of cooperation and compromise or watching the destruction of 
viable enterprises and asset value.”119 Even if the tension between two 
jurisdictions can be managed, case-level challenges still exist. 
Even with agreements in place, a lack of case-level coordination can 
be crippling to the successful resolution of a cross-border bankruptcy 
case. The liquidation of Allen Standford’s banks faced conflicting rulings 
from Canadian and English Courts based on differing rulings on the 
determination of the Foreign Main Proceeding (the United States and 
Antigua, respectively).
120
 In addition to struggles between Canada and 
England, “the Antiguan liquidators and the United States receivership 
were gearing up for fights over assets situated in other locations, such as 
Switzerland.” 121  The lack of cooperation between jurisdictions 
demonstrates some of the challenges still faced in developing effective 
coordination efforts in the resolution of cross-border insolvency cases 
even if over-arching agreements for cooperation are in existence. 
IV. FUTURE OF COOPERATION 
We are now entering into a time of historic levels of cooperation and 
information sharing.
122
 With widespread financial reform occurring 
around the world in response to the financial crisis in 2008–2009, 
changes in national bankruptcy systems could be a natural and necessary 
side effect. Often a prerequisite for “effective economic integration” 
between countries is a uniformity of bankruptcy laws, a concept 
recognized in the United States since the drafting of The Federalist 
Papers.
123
 As national systems are amending to adapt to growing 
globalization, some territorialist approaches could be relaxed amidst 
reform efforts for more cooperative measures that would promote 
                                                                                                                                  
of these jurisdictions, the political tension would make this almost impossible. For more on Cuba-
United States relations see Background Note: Cuba, U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm, (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). Even more recently the 
tensions between Iran have escalated, resulting in both the United States and E.U. announcing 
coordinating sanctions. These are political contexts and complications that can plague any 
coordination efforts between two jurisdictions. To read more about recent developments in Iran-
Western relations, see Iran, Country and Territory Reports, N. Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2012).  
119 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 12.  
120 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 521.  
121 See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 521. 
122 Quentin Peel, Keynote at International Bar Association 2009 Annual Conference (Oct. 4, 
2009). “In the first place, we were living in unprecedented world of open borders, free movement of 
capital and a lot of movement of people too. And the volume of the money that’s moving is of quite 
unprecedented quantities.” Id. 
123 See Perry, supra note 2, at n.11. 
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effective and efficient resolution of cross-border insolvency cases for 
multinational corporations. While the task of a “formalized mutual 
administration” that is “attentive to the distinct interests of the effective 
administration of foreign-located assets and the maintenance of state 
sovereignty” that are at odds in cross-border insolvency may be 
daunting, there are signs of progress in the international conversation.
124
  
Experts contend that the financial crisis that rippled through the world 
in 2008–2009 was the worst shock to the global economy since the 
1930’s.125 World leaders came together to stabilize the global economy 
and met in 2009 at the U.N. Conference on the World Financial and 
Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development to identify responses, 
both emergency and long term.
126
 As a result of increased 
communication and cooperation, global leaders, through the efforts and 
voice of the G-20,
127
 have promoted an effort to coordinate global 
policy.
128
  
The international system, as constructed following the 
Second World War, will be almost unrecognizable in 
2025. Indeed, international system is a misnomer. It is 
likely to be more ramshackle than orderly, its 
composition hybrid and heterogeneous, as befits a 
transition that will still be a work in progress . . . the 
[t]ransformation is being fuelled by a globalizing 
economy, marked by an historic shift of relative wealth 
and economic power from West to East, and by the 
increasing weight of new players especially China and 
India. 
129
 
Just recently, the G-20 again affirmed their commitment to advanced 
cooperative measures to promote financial stability in the international 
marketplace and work together to make “globalization serve the needs of 
our people.”130  The increased dialogue is highlighted by the growing 
                                                          
124  See Perry, supra note 2, at 477.  
125 Subir Lall, IMF Predicts Major Global Slowdown Amid Financial Crisis, IMF SURVEY 
MAGAZINE (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/res100808a.htm.  
126 Global Financial Crisis—An Overview, UN NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIASON SERV. (Nov. 11, 
2008), http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?article596.  
127 The Group of 20 (G20) is an informal body that brings together members of the Group of 8 
(G8) plus 12 more countries, including 9 that are “emerging market” economies. With 
leadership from the US and Canadian Finance Ministers, the group was created in 1999 in response 
to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis in order to “ensure broader participation in discussions on 
international financial affairs among countries whose size or strategic importance gives them a 
particularly crucial role in the global economy.” Roy Culpeper, Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A 
Flock of "Gs" in Search of Global Financial Stability, 18 (The North-South Inst., 2000). 
128 See Peel, supra note 122.  
129 See Peel, supra note 122 (citing The World in 2025, US National Intelligence Council 
(2008)). 
130 “Today, we reaffirm our commitment to work together and we have taken decisions to 
reinvigorate economic growth, create jobs, ensure financial stability, promote social inclusion and 
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number of venues for such transatlantic cooperation to develop. While 
there has been cooperation among nations within criminal and human 
rights law,
131
 international coordination is just now growing in 
international private law and its regulatory framework, providing a basis 
for a bankruptcy reform conversation. 
Other areas of growing global collaboration set the example for 
increased information and resource sharing within the insolvency 
context. For example, foreign institutions have measures in place to 
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of securities law 
violations. “Because territory-based conflicts approaches parcel out 
regulatory authority along geographical lines, it is evident that they are in 
many respects ill-suited to resolve conflicts in a world of cross-border 
activity.”132 The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MMOU), 
developed in 2002 and endorsed by IOSCO in 2005,
133
 is the first global 
information-sharing arrangement among securities regulators and sets a 
new “international benchmark for cross-border cooperation critical to 
combating violations of securities and derivatives laws.”134 The IOSCO 
MMOU, signed by securities regulators from eighty-six countries with 
thirty-four members listed in the Annex B List,
135
 recognizes the global 
nature of transactions and the necessity of countries working together to 
share information and assist in investigations to protect investors from a 
crime that is rarely contained within a single jurisdiction. The IOSCO 
MMOU increased interaction and cooperation between foreign securities 
regulators.
136
 Other initiatives have developed within jurisdictions to 
                                                                                                                                  
make globalization serve the needs of our people.” Press Release, French Presidency of the G-20, 
Building our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html. 
131 For example, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime “aims to enable 
different countries' law enforcement authorities to cooperate effectively in combating organized 
crime by eliminating differences and different definitions of crimes among national legal systems, so 
a crime in one country will be recognized as crime in other countries.” EC Ratification of UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, EUROPEAN UNION @ UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 
1, 2003), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2668_en.htm.  
132 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 931, 976 (Summer 2002). 
133  IOSCO Historical Background, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section= 
background (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
134 Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_ 
main (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  
135 “Members listed on Appendix B have committed to seeking the legal authority necessary to 
enable them to become full signatories to the IOSCO MMOU (Appendix A). For these members, 
cooperation in accordance with the standards set out in the IOSCO MMOU will begin on the date of 
its signing to Appendix A.” Multilateral MMOU: Current Signatories and Members Listed on 
Appendix B, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last visited Nov. 
22, 2011).  
136 MMOU Information Requests have consistently increased over the last seven years: 
Year Requests 
2003 56 
WINTER 2012                                    Cross-Border Bankruptcy 
46 
promote collaboration in the financial markets, like the efforts of the 
Office of Financial Research in the United States, established within the 
U.S. Treasury Department.
137
 Although securities fraud appears to be a 
more egregious crime than a creditor being denied their rights to a 
debtor’s assets because of jurisdictional limitations, the injuries to a 
creditor can be just as severe to that of a defrauded investor.
138
 The fact 
that countries are willing to work together to protect an investor provides 
the groundwork for similar arrangements in sharing information and 
resources to protect a creditor or debtor, regardless of the number of 
jurisdictions involved. 
Some of the more fundamental conflicts between insolvency laws 
have seen some resolution as states converge around the “rescue 
model.” 139  Although historically most insolvency systems have 
approached insolvency with the end goal of liquidation, countries are 
now “increasingly adopting and enhancing insolvency laws designed to 
facilitate reorganization of faltering businesses rather than immediately 
resorting to liquidation.”140  This shift is notable when examining the 
goals of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB “brings together 
national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant 
international financial centers, international financial institutions, sector-
specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and 
committees of central bank experts.” 141  Established to “address 
vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, 
                                                                                                                                  
2004 307 
2005 384 
2006 526 
2007 726 
2008 867 
2009 1261 
2010 1624 
Multilateral MMOU, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section= mou_main 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
137  “The goal of this organization is to collaborate with global regulatory community, by 
understanding what they are doing in collecting data, promoting research and establishing standards 
and sharing information.” Richard Berner, Counselor to the Sec’y of the Treasury, Regulatory Panel 
at the Center for Fin. Policy’s Systemic Risk and Data Issues Conference at the Robert H. Smith 
School of Business, University of Maryland (Oct. 6, 2011).  
138 Interestingly enough, the term for bankrupt in Italian has its roots in a term that can be 
traced back to “defraud,” leading to a translation of the debtor being a fraudster or crook. Wessels et 
al., supra note 12, at 5. Some creditors are often at a disadvantage in an insolvency proceeding if 
they hold an unsecured claim that has no priority in distribution or hold a dischargeable debt. Often, 
a creditor may only receive a few cents on the dollar for recovery of debt in bankruptcy. 
139 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 167. 
140 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 167. The “penetration of a new business rescue culture 
into nearly every corner of the globe is vividly illustrated by developments in one of the most 
tradition-bound nations in the world.” Id. For a further discussion of insolvency reforms that 
converge around a rescue model, see generally Wessels et al., supra note 12 at 167–195.  
141  Overview, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
overview.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  
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supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability,”142 the 
FSB is promoting a comprehensive policy framework “comprising a new 
international standard for resolution regimes, more intensive and 
effective supervision, and requirements for cross-border cooperation and 
recovery and resolution planning.”143 A lot of this reform is in response 
to the designation of Global Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (G-SIFIs) or institutions “too big to fail.” 
G-SIFIs are defined by the FSB as “financial institutions whose 
distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and 
systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the 
wider financial system and economic activity.” 144  In order to address 
policy considerations for the resolutions of these mega firms, the FSB is 
promoting legislative changes that will be required in many jurisdictions 
to strengthen cooperation.
145
 Both the United States and European Union 
have already adopted new regulations or amended legislation that 
addresses the resolution of these global institutions. New regulations to 
address the management of an orderly resolution of failing companies 
that have a large presence in multiple jurisdictions is arguably the 
strongest protection against another future public bailout.
146
 In this 
regard, the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States
147
 creates an Orderly 
Liquidation Authority
148
 for systemically important firms, and the 
European Union issued Directive on Credit Institutions Reorganization 
and Winding-Up which addresses the resolution of a bank systemically 
important to the European Union.
149
 However, “without an agreed cross-
border regime, both European and U.S. companies will [still] be hard to 
                                                          
142  History, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
history.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD]. 
143 Press Release, French Presidency of the G-20, Building our Common Future: Renewed 
Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-
cannes-declaration-111104-en.html. 
144  Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 4, 2011), www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.  
145 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 142.  
146 See Caliari, supra note 116, at 29. 
147 The Dodd-Frank Act is a wide-sweeping legislative reform requiring updated rules and 
regulations with the financial sector. The goal of the Act is “to promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, and to end ‘too 
big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. 2 (2010). For more information, see dodd-frank.com.  
148 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. 2 
(2010).  
149 The directive uses the principle of universality and was developed in response to the BCCI 
collapse, discussed supra, although not implemented in 2004. The purpose of the legislative 
framework, in part, is to eliminate obstacles to the freedom to establish and provide services within 
the European Community, and if difficulties arise in a credit institutions that have branches in 
multiple Member States. The European Community Insolvency Regulation excluded banks. See 
Andrew Campbell, Issues in Cross-Border Bank Insolvency: The European Community Directive on 
the Reorganization and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions, 3 CURRENT DEV. IN MONETARY AND FIN. 
LAW 515 (2003).  
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unwind.” 150  Even with legislation in place to address systemically 
important institutions, the legislation does not necessarily allow for 
coordination if that institution has an equally strong and vital presence in 
both the United States and European Union. The need for further 
cooperation in developing cross-border resolution regimes is illustrated 
by the difficulties in resolving large and complex cross-border 
institutions. Those resolutions reveal the need for significant transatlantic 
cooperation in order to ensure the credibility and viability of cross-border 
bank and financial companies’ resolution regimes and avoidance of 
bailouts.
151
  
Other organizations have also addressed providing a framework for 
the orderly resolution of “cross-border failures of large complex banking 
organizations,” recognizing the necessity of change. The Basel 
Committee’s152 Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group has developed ten 
recommendations
153
 for national authorities, which “aim at greater 
convergence of national resolution frameworks” and should “help 
strengthen cross-border crisis management” regarding these systemically 
important firms, particularly large banks or financial institutions.
154
 In 
order to adequately protect the global economy from the failure of these 
G-SIFIs or large financial institutions, countries are being asked to 
amend their national regulations to allow for increased global 
cooperativeness. Although reform has been primarily concerned with 
global financial institutions, the disorderly failure of a multinational 
manufacturing company, like our hypothetical GCP, could be just as 
problematic for maintaining stability in the global marketplace. With 
hundreds of thousands of employees relying on GCP for income, and 
suppliers and creditors relying on contracts with GCP, the collapse of 
GCP could have a rippling effect throughout the world’s economies. 
Widespread cooperation concerning G-SIFIs can provide the precedent 
for aligning diverse national bankruptcy systems and easing the historical 
friction in coordinating transnational insolvency cases. 
Attention to transatlantic reform within cross-border insolvencies 
continues to grow and a number of other international institutions—
notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—
are interested in reform of bankruptcy laws, both domestic and 
                                                          
150 See Caliari, supra note 116 , at 14. 
151 See Caliari, supra note 116, at 11. 
152 “The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on 
banking supervisory matters.” About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  
153 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
Border Resolution Group, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, (Mar. 2010), http://www.bis. 
org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.  
154 Daniel K. Tarullo, International Cooperation to Modernize Financial Regulation Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec.and Int’l Trade and Fin., Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20090930a.htm.  
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international.
155
 The World Bank has asserted the important benefit to 
market economies of an insolvency framework that is predictable: 
 
The creation . . . of a framework [for an insolvency 
system], and its integration within the wider context of 
the established legal process, are vital to the maintenance 
of social order and stability in the fullest sense: all 
parties in interest need to be in a position to anticipate 
their legal rights in the event of the debtor’s inability to 
pay, or to pay in full, whatever is due to them in 
consequence of their dealings and relationship. This in 
turn enables them to make calculations regarding the 
economic implications of such default by the debtor, and 
hence to estimate risk.
156
 
 
The IMF, in recognizing the world needs a new way of handling debt 
crisis, has entertained the option of creating bankruptcy “procedures on 
the international level that are similar to those that exist on the domestic 
level.”157 In this regard, the IMF would limit itself to the debt crises 
faced by countries in economic trouble, and would act as “a sort of 
bankruptcy court.” 158  While this proposal has sparked renewed 
discussion in an international forum for resolving bankruptcy disputes, 
the feasibility of this IMF proposal is challenged by limited resources 
and legal barriers. 
159
 “Regardless, the IMF and World Bank play an 
important role in the convergence of bankruptcy law by requiring 
bankruptcy reform in developing countries as a condition of loan 
support.”160 
Although there is increased transnational dialogue regarding broad 
financial reform and coordinated regulation, reforming cross-border 
bankruptcy laws may be more difficult to address because of the 
complexity of aligning differing national bankruptcy laws. Despite 
progress in international cooperation in some regulatory matters, like 
foreign securities law, countries may not see the benefit in changes in 
national bankruptcy systems that allow for cooperation. The hope is that 
with increased dialogue and collaboration within some regulatory 
frameworks, the discussion for more coordination in transnational 
insolvency cases can be broached. The best approach to cooperation may 
be through the insolvency protocol agreement on a case-level basis. 
                                                          
155 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 872. Other examples of organizations 
proposing international cooperation include INSOL International (International Association of 
Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals) and the International Insolvency Institute. 
156  Gordon W. Johnson, Building Effective Insolvency Systems: Towards Principles and 
Guidelines 1 (World Bank Paper, 1999) as reprinted in Mason, supra note 20, at 34.  
157 Ian Vaquez, The IMF as Bankruptcy Court for Countries?, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 10, 
2002), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/imf-bankruptcy-court-countries. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See Buxbaum, supra note 132, at 946.  
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V. A COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
A uniform global bankruptcy law, while entertained in academic 
discussions, is likely unfeasible. For the reasons discussed earlier 
countries have unique cultural, legal, and political systems in which they 
operate and transact, and those long-standing histories evolve only 
slowly and with corresponding baggage. In response to globalization, the 
best option for future cooperation most likely exists on the case-level 
insolvency protocol agreements. However, the case-level insolvency 
protocol needs to be supported by a strong over-arching international 
agreement between jurisdictions that would provide consistent guidance 
and precedent to protect debtors and creditors alike when transacting 
business. Predictability can be hard to come by in an inherently chaotic 
system like insolvency, and an advantage of having more universal rules 
could be increased predictability and therefore, stability.
161
 
The problems of the case-by-case protocol, like that used in Lehman, 
stem from a lack of authoritative weight to enforce the principles of the 
protocol. The international bankruptcy regime could use an IOSCO-like 
agreement, as mentioned supra in IV, that would help bind signatories to 
comply with case protocols for international insolvency proceedings, 
providing a legal context for this previously economic solution. This type 
of Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) would require 
a considerable amount of groundwork as countries would need to adapt 
their domestic laws to allow them to comply with an international 
agreement. While revolution is well underway thanks to the UNICTRAL 
Model Law, further revision is necessary. The agreement would govern 
the development and implementation of a protocol for a specific cross-
border case and would provide better clarity and structure in defining the 
players and roles of jurisdictions involved. The Foreign Main Proceeding 
would be an easier determination with objective criteria to ascertain the 
primary jurisdiction, and through this agreement, countries would pledge 
to support the main proceeding by whatever means necessary, within the 
limits of their domestic law. 
Although a widespread cooperative arrangement for insolvency 
would not be without its challenges, it could still be an important tool in 
managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. It is still unlikely that all 
jurisdictions would sign on to an agreement like this because of the 
cultural, political, and legal differences between countries. Ideally, 
however, enough countries would sign the agreement to make the 
principles of the agreement a standard practice in insolvency proceedings 
around the world and carry some authoritative weight. Using GCP as an 
example, if all the countries in which GCP had operations, suppliers, and 
creditors were signatories to the agreement, GCP would use the 
principles of the agreement to determine where the main proceeding 
should be filed. The agreement could contain an objective formula for 
                                                          
161 See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 51. 
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determining the primary jurisdiction; that is, a calculation based on 
where a majority of operating costs are incurred or where a majority of 
credit is obtained. After the main proceeding was finalized, the court in 
that primary jurisdiction would have the ability to request assistance, 
through the agreement, from other jurisdictions to consolidate assets and 
claims in the primary jurisdiction. The benefit of this solution for more 
streamlined cross-border insolvency proceedings, however, would be 
compromised if one of the jurisdictions GCP had operations in, like 
Brazil, did not sign the agreement and instead made a determination by 
its local laws that the main proceeding should be in Brazil. Hopefully the 
relatively widespread adoption of the IOSCO MMOU would bode well 
for similar adoption of an agreement in the insolvency context.    
VI. CONCLUSION  
Critical issues of predictability in business interactions that depend on 
transparency in applicable foreign regulations remain at the crossroads of 
insolvency law and private international law.
162
 As long as these issues 
remained unresolved by the current international insolvency scheme, 
there will be uncertainty and potential instability in the global market 
place. As a company like GCP highlights, most corporations interact in 
multiple jurisdictions and can be so integral to some marketplaces that a 
disorderly failure or collapse of the corporation could be catastrophic to a 
local or even regional economy. Compounding that inherent risk of 
failure and impact on the world economy, transactional costs also 
increase for globalized companies. If creditors are unsure as to how their 
claims would be resolved should GCP find itself unable to pay or pay in 
full its liabilities, GCP’s cost of doing business may increase (which 
could be passed on to consumers). In any insolvency, whether contained 
in a single jurisdiction or spanning multiple jurisdictions, the interests of 
the debtor, the creditor, and the legal environment or community in 
which they transact must be balanced. Insolvency law is so “intimately 
linked to the commercial, financial and social fabric of a state that 
finding this balance is inherently challenging.”163 With an agreement in 
place that establishes the guidelines for jurisdictions interacting and 
managing a multi-jurisdiction resolution, this balance could be met. As 
long as the economies of the world continue to interact at historic levels 
and corporations find themselves intricately interwoven in the world 
without regard to geographic borders, international insolvency reform in 
the form of cooperative efforts will be the key in maintaining future 
global financial stability. 
 
                                                          
162 See Mason, supra note 20, at 59. 
163 For more on the competing interests in an insolvency case see Mason, supra note 20, at 59.  
